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Introduction 
By way of introduction, it seems necessary to engage in a 
defining of terms as they are used in the rather lengthy title of 
this paper. The term "Romantic" adhered to Kierkegaard is 
precisely an attempt to show how Kierkegaard's paradigm of what 
constitutes a "self" brings one to the same way of perceiving and 
engaging reality as the Romantics: conscious imaginative 
relation. 1 The phrase "Re-formation of the Appearances" 
qualifies this relation. What is implied here is not that 
"objects" themselves change- ie: molecular structure- rather, 
that the perceiver shifts one's central position of perception. 
That is, one sees the same appearances differently. 2 The phrase, 
"Via Existential Arrest" bespeaks the catalyst which is 
responsible for this shift in perception. More precisely, in 
1 Romantics, as used here, refers primarily to a world view, 
not specific authors and poets, that the Romantics adhered to in 
opposition to major trends of Cartesianism born of the 
Enlightenment. It is the world view that sees the perceiver as an 
integral part of what is perceived - connected and participating in 
the phenomena, as opposed to a disposition of subject/object split, 
entertaining the positivistic modernist perspective of "absolute 
objectivity." More on this later. 
2 The terms "phenomena" and "appearances" are used 
interchangeably in this paper. It is well to note, however, that 
some schools of thought hold these to be different. The main 
difference is the view that phenomena per se involve that act of 
perception, and is therefore more an activity. For instance, one 
may ask if a rainbow exists without the perceiver; strictly 
speaking, it is not a phenomenon if their is no perceiver. In 
essence, this is the topic being discussed in this paper - holding 
that both appearances and phenomena entai 1, to one degree or 
another, the activity of imaginative relation. 
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Kierkegaardian terms, the existential arrest is that actual event 
of heightened consciousness of self, self-transcendence. 3 If the 
existential arrest is the event that initiates a disposition 
towards re-formation of the appearances, what is the actual means 
to this event? This is where the primary Kierkegaardian text for 
this paper comes into play: The Concept of Anxiety. 
For Kierkegaard anxiety is the inevitable concomitant of the 
reality of freedom brought on by one's consciousness of self as 
both infinitude and finitude, possibility and necessity. As 
Reidar Thomte writes in the introduction to The Concept of 
Anxiety: 
Man stands at the juncture of nature and spirit; he is 
involved both in freedom and necessity; he is both limited 
and limitless. 'Anxiety is the inevitable concomitant of 
freedom and finiteness in which man is involved ... It is the 
inevitable spiritual state of man, standing in the 
paradoxical situation of freedom and finiteness.' Anxiety 
is the permanent internal preconditioning of sin as well as 
of creativity. (xvii) 4 
Anxiety can lead one to become a self by becoming a synthesis, or 
an active agent, that is in constant interplay between infinitude 
and finitude. This activity, this third element, is what 
3 The term "event" is chosen carefully, for Kierkegaard views 
the "moment" as a process itself. In fact, for Kierkegaard, within 
the present moment eternity is to be found. 
4 The present writer is sensitive to the gender exclusive 
language used in this literature. Though the citations cannot be 
altered, the writer will use inclusive language. 
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Kierkegaard calls "spirit." It is, then, the synthesis of these 
two elements that constitutes a "self." "Man is a synthesis of 
the psychical and the physical; however, a synthesis is 
unthinkable if the two are not united in a third. This third is 
spirit" (Kierkegaard 43). 
As a "self", anxiety will lead one to either a position of 
faith, or a position of despair. 5 Notwithstanding, a position of 
despair can be closer to a position of faith than a "non-self", 
for the one in despair is conscious of it, and therefore a 
"self." However, due to the limited scope of this paper, the 
focus will be primarily on the means to a position of faith, not 
despair. 
The last phrase of the title, "Towards Conscious Imaginative 
Relation," bespeaks how the self can creatively engage the act of 
perceiving and literally transform the appearances via 
imagination. Imagination awakens infinitude, infuses hope, and 
transforms the appearances for the perceiver. Being self is to 
be empowered by the co-creativity of imagination to have a 
powerfully transformative impact on the appearances. 
Kierkegaard's paradigm cautions, however, that the self is still 
partially constituted by necessity and finitude - by its limits. 
5 For Kierkegaard, there are two kinds of despair - defiance 
and weakness -, and both are the opposite of faith. 
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Since the self is a synthesis, it is not only spirit and 
infinitude, and therefore one's necessity bears down on the self 
with certain parameters. For instance, although a paralyzed 
child can actively engage the possibility of being a ballerina, 
the child's necessity would not allow it. Nonetheless, 
Kierkegaard would argue that no one is without possibility, no 
matter how dreadful the necessity of their self. If one's 
necessity is not used as an invincible barrier, rather, as a 
challenge to growth, therefore, the way the appearances are 
perceived and engaged is still fluid and subject to the 
perceiver. Northrop Frye writes, "the conscious subject is not 
really perceiving until it recognizes itself as part of what it 
perceives 11 ( 23). 6 For Frye, the world that we image is more real 
than the one we stare at. It is in this spirit that this 
exploration is undertaken. 
One other introductory qualifier: the main title, 11 Romantic 
Perception, 11 is stated thus vis a vis modernity. The impact that 
11 the Enlightenment 11 has had on modern western civilization cannot 
be over-estimated in this study - particularly in the sciences. 
The deep trends of a Cartesian Subject-Object-split way of 
perceiving the appearances - claiming to be immune to 
6 In the extreme, one can make one's own life heaven or hell. 
That is, since one is actually part of what one perceives, one can 
inject positive or negative images, and thus, change the 
appearances. 
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participation - has penetrated every area of human life in the 
past three centuries; creating major shifts in epistemology and 
the notion of "absolute objectivity" - most evident in 
"positivism." Lurking behind the crevasses of "absolute 
objectivity" is the problem of idolatry. Obviously, idolatry was 
not born of the Enlightenment. However, to consciously sever the 
subject (self), though never entirely possible, from the 
perceived "object" is to fixate the dynamism of the ever-changing 
dialectic of subject-object relation - this is to engage in 
idolatry consciously. Post-Enlightenment idolatry pushes its 
roots much deeper than pre-Enlightenment, for it is engaged 
consciously. 7 Idolatry will be treated briefly in this paper. 
However, unable to deal with these mammoth issues in this study, 
let it suffice to say that this paper is advocating a post-
critical reclaiming of conscious imaginative participation with 
the phenomena. Owen Barfield called this "Final Participation," 
yet others have named it "Second Naivete." Whatever the label, 
inherent behind all this is the acceptance that, as post-
7 It is well to note here that the Enlightenment -with this 
subject-object split - has given birth to much wealth in human 
history. For instance, medicine. The ability to treat the body 
less mythically, and with more objectivity, had resulted in great 
advances in medical treatment. Capitalism, the Scientific and 
Industrial revolution, etc. are also positive and unprecedented 
advancements not unrelated to this new (Cartesian) way of 
perceiving the phenomena. The point is, that though greater goods 
have resulted, so too greater evils. An idolatry with depths 
unprecedented prior to the Enlightenment. 
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enlightenment humanity, it is impossible to re-capture a pre-
conscious romantic participation. Therefore, the only way into a 
participating relational mode of perception, in modern day, is 
consciously. 8 Now to the deliberation at hand. 
The focus of this paper is to attempt to analyze how, in 
Kierkegaard's paradigm of what constitutes "a self", there-
presentations of the phenomena change in the eyes of the 
perceiver from a state of "no self" - lacking this consciousness 
and active engagement of spirit-, to the moment of existential 
arrest, to a state of being "a self" - new and ever-growing 
consciousness as a result of this arrest. The primary source 
for this endeavour is Kierkegaard's text, The Concept of Anxiety. 
Methodology for this endeavour will involve explication of the 
text itself with nuances from other post-enlightenment literature 
- ie: authors such as Dostoevsky, Kafka, and Camus. Part one 
will address a state of existence which Kierkegaard believes is a 
state lacking "a self," focusing on the unconscious crisis of no 
8 To understand the state of the post-modern, take the analogy 
of a theatrical production. Pre-modernity - pre-enlightenment -
was a disposition that could enjoy a theatrical production without 
knowing all the mechanics used backstage. Modernity unveiled the 
production, taking away the back curtain exposing all the 
mechanical equipment, production crew, scaffolding, etc., working 
behind the scene to create this pseudo-reality for the audience. 
Finally, post-modernity is the ability to replace the back curtain, 
aware of all the mechanics at play, and consciously re-enter the 
romantic, second-naive perception that makes the reality of the 
theatre a delight once again. 
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self, and the resultant effect this has on one's imaging of the 
world - a brief look at idolatry. Part two will focus primarily 
on that which ultimately brings on an existential arrest: anxiety 
- the challenge of death, imminent and living. Finally, part 
three will deal with "self" established through active 
consciousness, and how it enables one to re-form the appearances 
via dialectical tension within the awesome creative power of re-
sponsibility and relation - the freedom to act upon, and to 
suffer, the phenomena. 
PART I 
A State Lacking Conscious Relation: "No Self" 
The biggest danger, that of losing self, can pass off in the 
world as quietly as if it were nothing; every other loss, an 
arm, a leg, five dollars, a wife, etc. is bound to be 
noticed. (Kierkegaard pp 62-63) 
Does a person gain anything if he wins the whole world but 
loses his life? (Mark 8:36) 
Spren Kierkegaard, writing in his assumed pseudonym Anti-
Climacus in Sickness unto Death, believes that loss of self, or 
not ever being a self at all, is the greatest danger within the 
human condition. From this viewpoint, in order to be a self one 
must be conscious that one exists. If, as Northrop Frye and the 
Romantics claim, the world is imaged by the perceiver via 
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imagination, then, the perceiver must first exist consciously, 
and, moreover, must engage their capacity to image and relate to 
the world. Consequently, this active relative consciousness 
assumes and engages the capacity to relate. In existential 
thought, one might say there is no true life without knowing you 
are alive, and actively engaging this consciousness. In this way, 
the state of "no self" lacks the third element of what 
constitutes a self: spirit (that which makes life more than 
unconscious and finite existence). "It [spiritlessness] worships 
sometimes a dunce and sometimes a hero. But nothing impresses it 
more than a charlatan. However, one fetish is soon replaced by 
another" (Kierkegaard 199). Kierkegaard qualifies his 
description of this state: 
The lostness of spiritlessness, as well as security, 
consists in its understanding nothing spiritually and 
comprehending nothing as a task, even if it is able to 
fumble after everything with its limp clamminess.(95) 
Most disturbing for Kierkegaard, however, is that for him 
the state of spiritlessness, is a state without anxiety. "In 
spiritlessness there is no anxiety, because it is too happy, too 
content, and too spiritless for that" (95). Lack of spirit, lack 
of active consciousness, therefore, results in fixed images 
(idolatry), loss of relation, and loss of self (or lack of self); 
"it is the perfect idol worshipper" (95). How, precisely, is 
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this idolatry? A brief interjectory on idolatry may be 
appropriate and helpful here. 
"Idolatry begins in the substitution (usually unconscious, 
but always at least partly so - for full consciousness of 
idolatry ends it) of some experienced form of God's presence for 
the presence itself" (Ridd 8). 
This substitution means that the human component in the 
experience comes to dominate the transcendent: the idolater 
remembers the God he has known, not YHWH ("I will be who I 
will be"). Emphasis is thrown on the human end of the 
relation. The living God is lost in the deadened memory -
and may eventually degenerate into an 'ism' or a principle 
or an entity. The advantage of an idol is that it can be 
placed, controlled and appealed to by the egocentric self 
(as the Biblical God cannot be). There is little wonder in 
this, for it is, increasingly, the self objectified ... 
Moreover, it looks like "the real thing": it bears the marks 
of its origin in the biblical God, transcendent, free, 
loving; yet without the draw-backs of uncertainty with 
regard to Him, and judgment form Him upon the very idols in 
which He is imaged. It gains in superficial plausibility 
what it loses in fundamental reality. It makes for 
believers who belong-again terribly-to themselves. 9 (Ridd 8) 
9 Idolatry is not just something ancient. The modern 
Christian periodically (several times a day habitually) 
recognizes that the world as he is inclined to construe it is not 
reality itself but a constellation of images ordered somewhat 
egocentrically in the course of his well-meaning but inevitably 
distorted stewardship. He calls this distortion sin. The 
remembrance that "the earth is the LORD's" constitutes a critique 
of his idolatry, a renewal of his capacity to let God be God, and 
a refurbishing of the world in a new realism: he can let it alone, 
now, in his mind - desist from having to dominate it. Mentally and 
physically he can let it be as perhaps he would say) "itself"; 
though what he then perceives is never "itself" in a crude sense, 
but a new image that arises out of his renewed relation with God 
and therefore with all "things." But the world is shining and 
lovely and real when this happens (Ridd 6). 
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Idolatry - fixed images - for Kierkegaard, then, is one of 
the major problems with a state lacking "self" - a state lacking 
active consciousness. Fixed images not only effects one~ 
relationship with YHWH, but with all phenomena. "The reason why 
idolatry is dangerous is that ... we may collapse into the 
preconscious state from which we have been trying to emerge" 
(Frye 27). When one is unaware of their creative and responsible 
capacity to image the world, the world becomes fixed. When one 
abandons their creative relational powers, one abandons the world 
to frozen objectification. The flow of life between the 
perceiver and the perceived ceases. Idolatry is blindness in 
the sense that one's way of seeing is fixed and all that is 
perceived must conform to this assumed rigid lens, illusion. 
In a similar way, loss of an engaged capacity to relate with 
the phenomena is another major defect of a "no self." The lure 
of sleepy, complacent, and fixed images is very strong for it 
requires no effort to relate. Relation requires creative energy, 
it requires spirit; a state of rejected relation does not. 
Hence, a fixed, non-fluid perception is very comfortable and non-
threatening. At times in history, for instance, this has been 
the indictment to the Catholic Church, that through occasional 
excessive mediatorship, she has undermined the individual~ 
capacity and desire to relate, as Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor, 
11 
in The Brothers Karamazov, argues: 
Behold what Thou didst further. And all again in the name 
of freedom! I tell Thee that man [sic] is tormented by no 
greater anxiety than to find someone [church] quickly to 
whom he can hand over that gift of freedom with which the 
ill fated creature is born" (Dostoevsky 235). 
The reformation protested that the Catholic Church had in certain 
instances in its history - eg: indulgences - far too willingly, 
and conveniently, taken away the responsibility of her members to 
relate, and create, the world; a burden and freedom beyond the 
masses, argues the Grand Inquisitor. This is one of the 
fundamental reasons for the ecclesiastical re-formation. As John 
S. Dunne, in A Search for God in Time and Memory, calls humankind 
to a relation modelled by Christ, namely one with no mediator. 
"Modern men [sic] have no mediators. For the mediator himself 
has no mediator- Christ's own relationship to God was an 
unmediated one" (75). "Who do you say I am" (Mark 8:29b). The 
mediation that is called for in relation to God is love and 
faith, the Holy Spirit. What is required is a consciousness of 
the necessity of relation and a willingness to embrace the 
responsibility of this relation. For Kierkegaard this requires 
"a self." Does a "non-self", then, end in nothingness? 
For Kierkegaard, not to be "a self" is the greatest of 
tragedies, and even worse that it goes unnoticed. Some writers, 
like Franz Kafka, attempt to depict this great tragedy, as is 
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well exemplified in the character K., in Franz Kafka's The 
Castle. This is the story of a man relentlessly embarked on a 
futile pursuit to reach the castle, unsuccessful due to his lack 
of consciousness of self, lack of authenticity. That is, he was 
too fragmented to reach that which he desired, wholeness; and was 
unaware of it. To K., "the castle hill was hidden, veiled in 
mist and darkness" (Kafka 3). Yet, "on the whole this distant 
prospect of'the castle satisfied K.'s expectations [fragmented]" 
(Kafka 11). One might say that every time K. came closer to 
experiencing an existential arrest (a heightened consciousness of 
self), it threatened him, "as if to threaten him with the 
fulfilment of his vague desire" (Kafka 21). Similarly, as the 
young rich man in Matthew's gospel was threatened by the 
fulfilment of his vague desire: eternal life. 
Jesus said to him, "If you want to be perfect, go and sell 
all you have and give the money to the poor, and you will 
have riches in heaven; then come and follow me." When the 
young man heard this, he went away sad, because he was very 
rich. (Matt 19:21-22) 
In light of this, one may ask what it is, ultimately, that brings 
on an existential arrest and thus enables one to become a "self" 
and to experience the fulfilment of one's vague desires - to 
transcend spiritlessness. In other words, what is the catalyst, 
for Kierkegaard, which brings on this arrest, and consequently, a 
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new consciousness? Moreover, how does this existential arrest 
transform the representations? 
PART II 
A Catalyst to Existential Arrest: Anxiety of Death 
"Even though there is no anxiety in spiritlessness, because 
it is excluded as spirit, anxiety is nevertheless present, except 
it is waiting" (Kierkegaard 96). Here, Kierkegaard is speaking 
from the perspective of~one with spirit. As he qualifies, 
"Viewed from the standpoint of spirit, anxiety is also present in 
spiritlessness, but hidden and disguised" (96). Nonetheless, it 
is still necessary to experience anxiety to become a self. 
Kierkegaard writes: 
I will say that this is an adventure that every human being 
must go through - to learn to be anxious in order that he 
may not perish either by never having been in anxiety or by 
succumbing in anxiety. (Kierkegaard 155) 
If anxiety lies dormant in one who is spiritless, and is 
necessary to become a self, the question become, "how can it be 
awakened?" 
One catalyst to existential arrest is death - experienced in 
different manifestations: 
When death appears in its true form as the lean and dismal 
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reaper, one does not look at it without terror; however, 
when it appears disguised in order to mock the men who fancy 
they can mock death, when the observer sees that the unknown 
figure who captivates all by his courtesy and causes all to 
exult in the wild gaiety of desires is death, then he is 
seized by a profound terror. (Kierkegaard 96) 
The anxiety of the presence of death in the world manifests 
itself in three pre-eminent existential experiences: imminent 
death, (the personal experience of knowing the actual moment 
before death); the threat of death, (the experience of knowing 
death is potentially very close, though not inevitable); living 
death, (the personal experience of the total meaninglessness and 
futility of existence). As evident from Kierkegaard, and the 
cross-section of literature cited below, it can be said that the 
reality of death has possibly been the single most effective 
catalyst to the awakening of anxiety, engageme~t of spirit, 
dawning of consciousness, and, consequently the re-formation of 
the appearances. 
Anxiety of Imminent Death 
Death remains as that which, itself unexplained, explains 
that the whole of life was a game that came to an end, 
... And so there is also a muteness of annihilation found in 
the fact that the whole was merely a children's game, and 
now the game is over. (Kierkegaard 93) 
Not the real thing. Everything you lived by and still live 
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by is a lie, a deception that blinds you from the reality of 
life and death ... the awareness of inevitable, imminent 
destruction. (Tolstoy pp 128-129) 
Depicting in dramatic form the same experience Kierkegaard 
writes about above, Leo Tolstoy has Ivan Ilyich, in The Death of 
Ivan Ilyich, struggle through the final moments of life - Ivan 
comes to a new consciousness of the deception of his life. The 
final moments of life, as he knows it, force him to this 
realization - an existential arrest. Only after awakened anxiety 
of the realization of the falsity of their lives, the lack of 
authentic self, does a re-formation of the appearances begin. 
"Yes, all of it was simply not the real thing. But no matter. I 
can still make it the real thing- I can" (Tolstoy 132). Just 
before his death he realizes that what he feared so greatly was 
not death, but life. Consequently, because of this new 
consciousness resulting from his existential arrest, Ivan can 
embrace life, and, thus, embrace a re-formed perception of death. 
"And death? Where is it? ... Instead of death there was light. 
'So that's it!' he exclaimed. 'What bliss!'" (Tolstoy 133). 
Could this be the shift in perception that Luke depicts Jesus as 
recognizing in the criminal hanging on the cross next to Jesus? 
"Jesus said to the dying criminal, 'I promise you that today you 
will be in Paradise with me'' (Luke 23:43). 
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Anxiety of the Threat of Death 
And this is the moment of culmination, the moment when he is 
greatest, not the moment when the sight of his piety is like 
the festivity of a special holiday, but when by himself he 
sinks before himself in the depth of sin-consciousness. 
(Kierkegaard 110) 
The anxiety of the sheer threat of literal death can also 
bring a sudden heightened self-consciousness, the anxiety towards 
existential arrest. For example, in Albert Camus' The Plague, 
several of the characters of the novel slowly realize that the 
plague is among them. It is this very threat of death that stirs 
the people of Oran from their complacent sleep of habitual 
"life", "a matter of lucidly recognizing what has to be 
recognized" (Camus 37) . 10 As Kierkegaard would put it, "Anxiety 
takes swift action, instantly plays the trump card of infinity, 
of the category, and the individual cannot take the trick" (160). 
The threat of physical death, however, leads to a much more 
profound and frightening experience of anxiety towards 
existential arrest, the moment of living death. 
Anxiety of Living Death 
10 In truth, the anxiety of death is also the anxiety of life 
itself. This will qualified in the following section. 
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The moment signifies the present as that which has no past 
and no future, and precisely in this lies the imperfection 
of the sensuous life. The eternal also signifies the 
present as that which has no past and no future, and this is 
the perfection of the eternal. (Kierkegaard 87) 11 
It is to the existential arrest of the eternal present that 
Kierkegaard hopes anxiety will lead one. 12 In a very similar 
way, as Albert Camus writes in The Myth of Sisyphus, the most 
profoundly acute, yet evasive, catalyst to the experience of 
existential arrest is the anxiety of living death, (the personal 
experience of total meaninglessness and futility of eternal 
existence). "The absurd man [sic], when he contemplates his 
torment, silences all the idols" (Camus 123). Camus claims, in 
The Myth of Sisyphus, in order for this existential arrest to 
occur and the appearances to be re-formed, "the mind must meet 
the night" (65). "There is no sun without shadow, and it is 
11 For Kierkegaard "the present is the eternal, or rather, the 
eternal is the present, and the present is full" ( 86). "The 
present, however, is not a concept of time, except precisely as 
something infinitely countless, which again is infinitely 
vanishing. If this is not kept in mind, no matter how quickly it 
may disappear, the present is posited, and being posited it again 
appears in the categories: the past and the future" (Kierkegaard 
86). 
12 Kierkegaard recognizes, however, that this is not the 
necessary end. He writes, "men are not willing to think eternity 
earnestly but are anxious about it, and anxiety can contrive a 
hundred evasions. And this is precisely demonic" (154). 
Unfortunately, due to the parameters of this paper, these evasions 
cannot be dealt with directly. 
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essential to know the night" (123). Hence, it is in the moment 
of knowing the night (despair), that one is thrust into a new 
consciousness. "Kierkegaard thinks despair offers the only 
avenue to 'truth and deliverance'" (Hannay 5) . 13 That is, it is 
the moment when one is experiencing both the human condition, and 
the consciousness of self experiencing the human condition. This 
is to become an authentic self, and, consequently, it is this 
disposition which emancipates one's capacity to 
reform/transfigure the appearances. Likely for this reason, 
"Kierkegaard saw his own mission as a writer as that of assisting 
his readers to the consciousness of their own despair" (Hannay 
6). "You will know the truth, and the truth will set you free" 
(John 8:32). Undergirding all this, however, remains the gnawing 
question of exactly how the pain and "angst" of anxiety can 
ultimately lead one to fullness of self, fullness of life. 
Kierkegaard writes: 
The relation, as always with the relation of anxiety, is 
sympathetic and antipathetic. This in turn seems 
paradoxical, yet such is not the case, because while anxiety 
fears, it maintains a subtle communication with its object, 
cannot look away from it, indeed will not, for if the 
individual wills it, repentance is there. (103). 
13 Kierkegaard sees despair as the opposite of faith. 
Therefore, despair as it is used in this context, implies more the 
culmination of anxiety before God, not the explicit rejection of 
God. 
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This, then, leads to the activity of being "a self," the action 
of conscious imaginative relation. 
Part III 
To Be "a Self": Conscious Imaginative Relation 
"Man [self] is a synthesis of psyche and body that is 
constituted and sustained by spirit" (Kierkegaard 81). The third 
element, spirit, is the activity of interaction which was brought 
on by anxiety, through existential arrest. Thus, Kierkegaard 
confidently posits: 
That anxiety makes its appearance is the pivot upon which 
everything turns. Man is a synthesis of the psychical and 
physical; however, a synthesis is unthinkable if the two are 
not united in a third. This third is spirit. (43) 
However, what is meant by spirit? Kierkegaard defines "spirit is 
a friendly power, since it is precisely that which constitutes 
relation" (44). This given, however, does relation only entail 
the interaction between the psychical and the physical? 
Evidently not only in an isolated autonomous sense, for elsewhere 
Kierkegaard writes, "At every moment, the individual is both 
himself and the race. This is man's perfection viewed as a 
state" (28). Going even further, on the last page of The Concept 
of Anxiety, Kierkegaard writes on the transformative power of 
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relation: 
Because the significant actuality is after all not so 
terrible as the possibility he himself had fashioned, and 
which he used his strength to fashion, whereas he can now 
use all his strength against actuality. (162) 
As a result of establishing an authentic self, this new 
consciousness and perception, as well as the representations,· 
engage their capacity to be creatively re-formed; as Sisyphus 
could do, only in the whole knowledge of his wretched condition: 
Sisyphus ... knows the whole extent of his wretched 
condition. It is what he thinks of during his descent 
If the descent is thus sometimes performed in sorrow, it can 
also take place in joy. (Camus 121) 
This is the emancipating freedom of response-ability and 
relation. Within responsibility is the freedom of choice. "Your 
eyes will be opened knowing good and evil" (Genesis 3:5). 
Hence, knowing good and evil, one can, and must, choose one or 
the other. Like the Older Testament writer scribes, "I am 
offering you life or death, blessing or curse. Choose life" 
(Deut.31:19). The ability to respond consciously enables one to 
establish that whose loss Kierkegaard so greatly feared: the 
self. "Selfhood is constituted in consciousness; it is itself, 
if you like, a degree of consciousness" (Hannay 7). Thus, when 
one is conscious that they can be a responding member of the 
dialogue with the phenomena they perceive, they are free to 
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systematically engage their imagination creatively. Owen 
Barfield, in Saving the Appearances, describes it as the ability 
"to experience the representations as idols, and then to be able 
to perform an act of figuration consciously" (147). 
Notwithstanding, there is a great onus in recognizing the 
responsibility of relation. Northrop Frye proposes that the 
conscious subject is not really perceiving until it recognizes 
itself as part of what it perceives (23). In this sense, then, 
everyone is responsible for everyone, for within everyone is part 
of oneself. As Paul writes to the Corinthians, "all of us, 
though many, are one body" (10:17). That is, the freedom of 
relation which enables one to respond as co-creator of the 
representations also requires one to suffer the representations 
in order to maintain the dialectical tension that relation, by 
its very nature, requires. This is, in essence, a suffering 
relation - putting love and building up of community above one~ 
personal desires and freedoms - as Paul so urgently calls for in 
Romans chapters 14-15. 14 Indeed, even scripture must be read 
within this dialectical relation, as Luke T. Johnson writes in 
the very last sentence of The Writings of the New Testament, 
"living conversation with all the writings in all their diversity 
14 There are places in Pauline and deutero-Pauline writings 
that summon this type of behaviour. 
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and divergence ... Only so can they continue to speak" (548). 
Relation entails the paradox of the freedom to suffer. 
Freedom to suffer may seem like an oxymoron, however, it simply 
implies that, in order for an authentic creative relationship to 
exist, both "subject" and "object" must act and suffer one 
another. 15 Owen Barfield described this type of vulnerability as 
"an extra-sensory link between the percipient and the 
representation 11 (34). This vulnerability, as evident in the 
Romantics 1 can run many risks, Kierkegaard maintains: "He who 
has not suffered under human bestiality will not become spirit" 
(Hannay 7). It seems quite possible that this open vulnerability 
to relation is what inspired Luke to have Jesus utter from the 
cross, "Father 1 forgive them, for they do not know what they are 
doing" (Luke 23:34). 
From the foregoing, it seems quite apparent that anxiety 
induced existential arrest has a definite impact on the re-
formation of the appearances. One may even conclude that without 
anxiety towards this arrest, the images, to the unconscious 
15 This is, by no means, an attempt to justify or glorify the 
presence of suffering in the world, particularly that of the 
innocent. Suffering in the world remains a great theological issue 
of relentless debate - particularly in the concerns of Liberation 
Theology. To suffer, as it is implied here, is to be vulnerably 
open to relation. It is to have the willingness to allot another 
the same creative freedom to image the world. Freedom can only be 
realized in relation. Tragically, this awesome freedom has been so 
terribly abused throughout history, as it continues to be abused in 
modern day. 
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percipient, are bound to remain fixed (idolatry). 
Notwithstanding, within this new consciousness of one's extended, 
responsive, and relative presence in the phenomena - an authentic 
self -, one is ultimately brought to a re-formation of the 
appearances which engages the potential to move even beyond 
"Barfield's rainbow," which Fyodor Dostoevsky, in The Brothers 
Karamazov, so sagaciously captures in Mitya's exclamation from 
prison: 
Yes, life is full, there is even life underground ... You 
wouldn't believe, Alexey, how I want to live now, what a 
thirst for existence and consciousness has sprung up in me 
within these peeling walls ... And what is suffering? I am not 
afraid of it ... ! exist. In thousands of agonies- I exist. 
I'm tormented on the rack- but I exist! Though I sit alone 
on a post - I exist! I see the sun, and if I don't see the 
sun, I know it's there. And there's a whole life in that, 
in knowing that the sun is there (pp.560-561). 
This is Romantic Perception, to actively engage the creative 
transformation of the appearanceS. 16 For the post-modern, 
romantic perception can only be re-claimed consciously - that is, 
to enter a second-naivete. Similarly, for Kierkegaard, when an 
16 This is very similar to how Karl Rahner understands "self 
as Subject", and God's presence in the world. In our "fundamental 
option," - the capacity to orient ourselves through the radical 
nature of freedom (irrevocable actions) - we have the co-creative 
capacity to make ourselves. In the dimension of faith, romantic 
perception is another way of describing the capacity to see God in 
all the appearances - not to see God as simply another category, 
rather a mode, a way of perception that opens one to an entirely 
new dimension. 
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authentic self has been established - through anxiety, through 
existential arrest, to conscious imaginative relation - one has 
shifted in locus of perception of the appearances. This leads to 
either despair or faith. 17 In the latter, however, anxiety is 
extricated. "As soon as the actuality of freedom and of spirit 
is posited, anxiety is cancelled" (Kierkegaard 96). Thus, on the 
romantic perception of a stance of faith, Kierkegaard then 
writes: 
[Faith gives] courage to renounce anxiety without anxiety, 
which only faith can do; faith does not thereby annihilate 
anxiety, but, itself eternally young, it extricates itself 
from anxiety's moment of death. Only faith is able to do 
this, for only in faith is the synthesis eternal and at 
every moment possible. (117) 
17 Again, in Kierkegaard's Christian anthropology, he sees the 
individual without spirit in active relation with God as an 
inauthentic self. As Reidar Thomte writes on Kierkegaard, "The 
God-relation is an ontological quality of the self, apart from 
which the self cannot fully actualize or know itself as the 
infinite self" (xvii). 
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